View of Honda Point. Personal photo, March 2019
Stick tap to a former US Navy lieutenant that I worked with at Vandenberg and told me the story many years ago.
The Story
In a quiet, back area of Vandenberg Air Force Base, located in what is known as the Central Coast of California, sits a piece of shoreline with a rather nasty reputation. It is the entrance to the Santa Barbara Channel, a waterway between the mainland coast and the Channel Islands, and a well-used maritime route. Known locally as both Honda Point and Point Pedernales, the area has also garnered the nicknames "Jaws of Honda" or "The Devil's Jaws" from the sheer number of ships and sailors who have met their makers against the sharp rocks and swift currents. While there is always some danger, today's technology makes trekking this beautiful stretch of sea much easier for the tourists, whale watchers, and oil rig employees that make up most of the traffic now. Ninety-six years ago, however, it was the site of the worst peacetime naval disaster in US history.
It was 1923. The US Navy was still working on developing new strategies for combating the emerging submarine technology demonstrated by the German Navy during WWI. A new type of destroyer, the Clemson class, had been commissioned from 1919-1922, and were still being put through their paces. Clemson-class destroyers, also known as "four-stackers", were expected to be fleet escorts. (Friedman 40) These ships were ~314 feet long and 32 feet wide, slightly shorter than a modern football field (it's September, football is a thing), and about about 2/3 the width. Definitely not your modern aircraft carrier city-on-the-sea, but a pretty good sized ship. It had a top running speed of about 32 knots, or just under 37 miles per hour, and, when a full crew complement was authorized, carried 131 sailors per ship.
On 08 September of that year, Destroyer Squadron 11, a group of fifteen of these ships, became very grateful they were only running with about two-thirds of their men.(Trudeau) The squadron was to perform some training exercises off the coast of San Francisco with another squadron, then turn south and run down the coast to San Diego, with the intent of testing if the ships could maintain specific formations, radio silence, and a speed of 20 knots during the entire 430-mile, 19-hour trip. (Hoag 17) The ships were to travel in three side-by-side columns of five ships each for the majority of the run, with the U.S.S. Delphy leading the center column as flagship, then move into a single column in order to navigate the Santa Barbara Channel.
The radio silence order was to allow the crews to train communication between ships, as well as practice deduced reckoning navigation, rather than radio navigation. (Fun Fact: deduced reckoning is often shortened to what we hear as "dead reckoning" but is, in fact, written "ded. reckoning".) This means that navigators were calculating the position of the ship simply by using their course, speed, and last known location. (Glossary of Nautical Terms) For example, if the navigator knew they had been traveling at 20 knots for the last two hours on a southward course, he could factor in the correct effects of the current and winds, and work out that the ship should be at least X number of miles south of their previous location. This navigation technique was used partly due to the heavy fog that often covers the California coast, preventing the use of usual landmarks, and also because radio navigation, which was available and being trained by the Navy in 1923, was a relatively new technique, and not always trusted by sailors of that time. (Hoag 12) The officer who had taken over navigation of the Delphy, in particular, believed several of the radio bearings given to the ship over the course of the journey to be erroneous. (Trudeau)
There were some problems with using ded. reckoning in this particular instance, though. For one, a recent earthquake in Japan had slightly altered the currents in the Pacific, a phenomenon we know about and account for now, but was not well understood or communicated in 1923. (Silva 6) The ships were also likely not traveling at the navigator's calculated speed of 21 knots due to the choppy seas and strain of maintaining that speed on the engines. It is likely that they were really only traveling around 19 knots. (Trudeau) That’s only a difference of about three miles per hour, but over the course of several hours, that added up to being 8-10 miles off course – a big deal when you’re trying to make a relatively sharp turn into a narrower body of water. (Boyd)
Planned v. Actual Route. Photo credit: The Baltimore Sun
Unfortunately, there was no way for the ships' navigators to be fully aware of their errors until it was much too late. Around 4:27p local time, the ships dutifully maneuvered into their single-column formation for entering the Channel, unaware that several of them were lining up for their doom. At approximately 9:00p, near what is now called Pedernales Point, the squadron executed the fatal turn to the southeast, bearing 095 degrees, with the distance of about three football fields separating the ships from each other.
Seven US Navy destroyers slammed onto the rocks of the Pacific Coast in less than fifteen minutes. The
flagship, Delphy, was followed by the Young, then Chauncy, Nicholas, Woodbury,
Fuller, and finally the S.P. Lee. Newspaper accounts of the incident describe the ships as "…piled up like sheep following a leader.” The Delphy smashed directly onto the rocks of
the coast, then was hit by the Young, who had been in formation around 300
yards behind. Chauncy then hit Young. Nicholas, Woodbury, Fuller, and S.P. Lee all
tried to divert, but were much too late and also crashed onto the sharp rocks of the Central Coast. The
greatest immediate threat was to the Young, which “keeled over on her side in a
minute and thirty seconds.” (United Press Leased Wire)
The darkness, the oil filling the water, the deadly currents of the Jaws of
Honda, and the razor-sharp rocks quickly began to tear the ships apart and create chaos. Adding further confusion was the fact that a completely unrelated ship, the S.S. Cuba, had wrecked off San Miguel Island just a few hours before Squadron 11 came into the area. One of Squadron 11's ships, the U.S.S. Reno, had been dispatched to help with rescue efforts for the Cuba, so luckily missed the rest of the squadron's disaster, but added to the confusion of radio distress calls being sent out. (Hoag 17) The seven remaining destroyers in the squadron were able to maneuver around the wrecks and rocks, after noticing the leading ships’ lights go out one by one. They were able to get into a position to deploy lifeboats and pick up survivors. (United Press Leased Wire) The crew of another fishing boat in the area, the Nueva Roma, was able to work their vessel around the rocks and pick up an additional sixty sailors who had managed to get away from the sinking vessels but were stranded on an offshore rock. (Hoag 37)
The thunderous crash of the Delphy hitting the rocks was also enough to wake up the foreman of a local railroad station near the shore. John Giorvas has been credited as the first person on shore to realize what was going on after investigating the noise and seeing "unusual motions" in the water below the point. (Hoag 33) Despite
the isolation of the area, Giorvas roused his rail crew, who spread the alarm to other nearby
communities. Locals gathered on the top of the crags and lit
bonfires to help light the area and provide warmth to the survivors who were
slowly making their way out of the now dangerously oil-slicked water and up the
cliff. Doctors from nearby towns were brought to the site to treat the wounded,
and a special train was enlisted to take the more seriously injured from nearby
Lompoc to the hospitals in Santa Barbara. Donations of blankets and medical
supplies arrived on another train. A woman named Mrs. Charles T. Atkins is
credited for organizing an immediate food drive, coordinating the cooking of
meals and feeding survivors and rescuers through the course of the night. She
was later quoted as believing she and the other volunteers had made “700 ham
sandwiches, cooked many sides of bacon, lots of turkey, and plenty of bread and
butter” during the rescue. (Hoag 36)
Thanks to the rescue
efforts of sailors and civilians, 746 sailors were saved. (Hoag 35) However, a s the
morning of 9 Sep 1923 dawned, the full scale of the previous evening’s disaster
became apparent. Fuller and Woodbury were stranded on the outer rocks of the
Point, high tide submerging the ships. Nicholas and S.P. Lee were on the north
side of the beach, their hulls punctured by rocks. Chauncy had gotten trapped
upright on the inland rocks, with high tide covering all but about two feet of
her hull. Young was submerged and on her side. Delphy was almost completely
submerged and broken in half from Young’s impact. (United Press Leased Wire)
Thirteen million dollars of US Navy ships and equipment lay broken and battered
by the surf and surge (Trudeau) ,
but more tragically, twenty three sailors lost their lives that night – two were
knocked overboard off the Delphy, one from Chauncy reportedly panicked and threw himself into
the ocean, and twenty brave souls who were trapped in an inner compartment had no hope of escape when
the Young capsized. (United Press Leased Wire)
In the aftermath, eleven officers, including each of the wrecked ships' captains, the squadron commander, and the navigator on the Delphy, were recommended for court-martial by early November 1923, the largest number of cases ever brought together before a naval court. Three were ultimately found guilty of, among other things, "unskillful navigation." More importantly, though, a grand total of twenty three officers and men were cited for outstanding courage and performance in saving the lives of their fellow crewmen. (Trudeau) The last known survivor of the incident passed away in 2005. (Nelson)
Today, Honda Point seems peaceful, almost serene. The Navy chose to scrap the destroyers as much as possible, but the wrecks still sleep below the choppy surface of the water. The Chauncy was still visible, even at high tide, until at least 1976 (Silva 3), and the remains of a few of the other ships are supposedly still visible at low tides, although I was not able to confirm this myself. On the sixtieth anniversary of the event, in 1983, the American Legion created and dedicated a memorial for the disaster in the nearby town of Lompoc, using a propellor salvaged from the Delphy. (Silva vii)
Honda Point Memorial, Lompoc, CA. Personal photos, March 2019
Another memorial was dedicated at Honda Point using the anchor from the Chauncy, however, since the area is now part of an active USAF base, and quite close to one of Vandenberg's famous rocket launch sites, it is difficult for the public to get access by land or sea. Natural erosion has also made the trek out to the memorial site quite treacherous. Base leadership has since donated the anchor to the Lompoc Valley Historical Society for preservation, and blocked off the footpath to all personnel. However, if you can get on base, and know the way to the memorial (which is very isolated and not well marked), you can work your way to a small clearing and view the site of the memorial from about 100 yards away. (I was in a skirt and heels the only day I was able to make it out to the site, and was not going to push my luck trying to get any closer to the plaque.)
Honda Point Memorial, Vandenberg AFB, CA. Personal photo, March 2019
Anchor from U.S.S. Chauncy, Lompoc Valley Historical Society. Photo credit: Karen Paaske
Honda Point has claimed numerous victims over the centuries, but there are no other recorded instances of ships lining up, with literally military precision, to be smashed on the rocks of the Central Coast. The wrecks, I am told, are fascinating to dive, if you can get permission to enter the area by sea, and are a true reminder that "natural forces and human error created a perilous journey that brought to light the strength, courage, and intrepid spirit of the brave 'tin can' sailors" who became trapped, some permanently, in the Devil's Jaws that night ninety six years ago. (Boyd)
Further Reading
The few books that have been written on the Honda Point disaster are, quite frankly, a bit dry, but extremely detailed and informative. Unfortunately, many are either out of print, or only available locally around the Central Coast. From those, I would recommend Maury Hoag's Jaws of Honda, which was cited heavily in this post, and includes many photographs that help capture the location and the time period. My other "favorite" reference for this post was Noah Andre Trudeau's article for Naval History Magazine, entitled "A Naval Tragedy's Chain of Errors", which broke down a lot of the maritime concepts for land-lubbers like me. I also was able to find quite a few contemporary newspaper and periodical articles detailing the disaster and resulting aftermath online.
______________________________________________________________________________________
Boyd, Ellsworth. "Devil's Jaw Crunches Seven Navy
Destroyers." 03 Dec 2018. National Underwater and Marine Agency.
Web Article. 04 Apr 2019.
<http://www.numa.net/2018/12/devils-jaw-crunches-seven-navy-destroyers/>.
Channel Islands Dive Adventures. The Devil's Jaw. Channel Islands Dive Adventures. The Wrecks and Disaster of Honda Point & the 'Devil's Jaw'. n.d. Photograph. 29 Mar 2019. <https://channelislandsdiveadventures.com/california-channel-islands-diving/honda-point-wrecks/>.
Friedman, Norman. US Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History. Revised edition. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. 2004. ISBN 1-55750-442-3.
Glossary of Nautical Terms. 21 Mar 2019. 27 Mar 2019.
<http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glossary_of_nautical_terms>.
Hoag, Maury. Jaws of Honda. Revised Edition.
Maury Hoag, 2001.
Nelson, Valerie J. "Gene Bruce, 98; Last Known
Survivor or 1923 Naval Disaster." Los Angeles Times 12 Dec 2005:
B7. 4 Apr 2019. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/239752881>.
Silva, Joe. Honda Left Turn 095. Santa Cruz, CA: Joe and Mary Silva, ~1986.
Silva, Joe. Honda Left Turn 095. Santa Cruz, CA: Joe and Mary Silva, ~1986.
Trudeau, Noah Andre. "A Naval Tragedy's Chain of
Errors." Naval History Magazine Feb 2010. 29 Mar 2019.
<https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2010/february/naval-tragedys-chain-errors>.
United Press Leased Wire.
"Seven U.S. Destroyers Pile Up on Rocks of California Coast." Visalia
Daily Times 10 Sep 1923: 1, 5. 25 Mar 2019.
<https://www.newspapers.com/image/531632645>.
Merkur Fits & Permit Casino Review - Deccasino
ReplyDeleteFits & Permit Casino is a gambling company offering online kadangpintar sports betting, slot machines, lottery tickets, live games, sportsbooks, poker and 메리트 카지노 more. choegocasino